Biosecurity measures impede medical research
A deep sense of insecurity is worrying most authorities in the face of bioterrorism, which is unlikely to go away in the foreseeable future. This has prompted measures to ensure that pathogenic organisms and other toxins in research and diagnostic laboratories are strictly controlled and protected. But these measures are causing a problem for those engaged in legitimate biomedical research.
The issue has been raised by two scientists at Sandia National Laboratories
in Albuquerque, US, in the 30 April issue of Science.
At the root of the problem is how to ensure a degree of biosecurity without
seriously impeding biomedical research. Regulations in the US set out
lists of agents that pose a threat to humans, domesticated animals and
plants. Laboratories that possess any of these agents have to meet security
arrangements that have a daunting aspect. The facility in question must
be registered, and an individual must be designated responsible for carrying
out the provisions for controlling substances. Individuals having access
to them must be assessed for their possible risk.
Rules for the transfer of materials must be observed, and those concerned
must undergo safety and security training and inspection. If a listed
substance is stolen, lost or released into the environment, the circumstances
must be recorded. Certain types of experiment are restricted.
There is a list of “restricted persons” who are prohibited
from conducting research involving any of the substances designated,
and there is a sharp division between those judged secure and the rest.
This provision has been claimed to infringe the fundamental right of
universities to educate anyone who has chosen a given field of knowledge.
Exception has also been taken to security measures that, for example,
place Bacillus anthracis and Rickettsia rickettsii in the same category,
although it is agreed that the potential of the first as a bioweapon
is far greater than that of the second.
To avoid the hassle and added expense of compliance, researchers are
discontinuing work in fields of study that involve them in complying
with the latest security regulations. Many institutions also have decided
not to pursue some of their programmes that threaten sanctions. It is
pointed out in Science that such actions are bound to suffocate valuable
public health research, and further compromise the healthy response to
bioterrorism and outbreaks of infectious disease in the community.
An intellectually defensible policy needs to be developed and applied.
The recommendation is that biosecurity levels should correspond to research
with low, moderate, high and extremely dangerous materials. Most laboratory
pathogens would fall into the first category and are already covered
by accepted precautions, or else subjected to normal additional safeguards.
Very few agents fall into the high risk class. Possibly the variola virus,
a major organism that no longer occurs naturally, might be regarded as
posing an extreme risk.
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